Emergency Power in Hungary and the COVID-19 (Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies)

My new paper has been published:

Antal, Attila. 2023. “Emergency Power in Hungary and the COVID-19”. Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies 16 (3):59-77. https://doi.org/10.22215/cjers.v16i3.3727.

We live in an era of overlapping states of exceptions: the climate and ecological emergency, the permanent crisis of global capitalism, the migration crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic. Relying on the Hungarian political regime, this paper investigates how and why exceptional measures restructure our life. It can be argued that the main outcome of the exceptional measures is the rise of a new executive power, and it is demonstrated how heavily authoritarian regimes rely on the state of exception. It has been argued here that behind the strengthening of the emergency power there is the new rise of unlimited executive power, which is nothing more than the legal and political fulfilment of two-thirds majority power. Upon the case of the permanent state of exception of the Orbán regime, it can be said that the COVID-19 as an epidemiological crisis cannot be traced back to the Orbán administration, but the executive power has found a way to create a new political crisis based on the epidemic. The paper briefly discusses the impact of the 2022 Hungarian national election campaign period and the Russian aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 on the Hungarian emergency powers.

Communist populism in Hungary

My paper ("Communist populism in Hungary") has been published in Society and Economy 40(4), pp. 623–642. https://doi.org/10.1556/204.2018.40.4.9

According to Cas Mudde, we live in a “populist Zeitgeist”. The paper argues that not just the 21st, but also the 20th century is about populism. In the first section I elaborate the theoretical background of populism, which is claimed to be a never-ending phenomenon: here, various notions of populism are analysed; I investigate the relationship between democracy and populism; and I refer to the biopolitical framework of populism (called biopopulism) as well. This theoretical framework will be used to analyse Communist populism in Hungary. I elaborate the populism of the Horthyera (1920-1944) in the context of Communist populism. Then I analyse the case of Communist populism in Hungary (1948-1989) according to the following aspects: in the context of the working class and the bourgeois elite; the biopolitical character of the regime; goulash Communism as populist legitimacy; and the viewpoint of socialist patriotism. The main aspect of Communist populism is summarized at the end of the third section, and I briefly refer to the afterlife of Communist populism as a nostalgic phenomenon. The regimes analysed in this study aimed to govern the entire life of the citizens, which is why biopopulism is a useful analytical concept. The biopopulist framework shows that the investigation of the historical backgrounds of populism is necessary to understand contemporary populist tendencies.

The paper is available on Society and Economy and my Academia.edu

Ecopopulism and environmental justice in Eastern and South Europe

I had the privilege having a lecture at "Environmental Justice in the Anthropocene Symposium" held on April 24-25, 2017, at the Lory Student Center, Colorado State University, Fort Collins Colorado. According to this lecture a paper has been written about ecopopulism and environmental justice. This paper has been published at the Symposium dedicated website. The paper has az individual handle: https://hdl.handle.net/10217/183742

The abstract can be seen below and the full text is available from the Symposium page and my Academia.edu

I am dealing in this paper with the question of environmental and climate (in)justices in Eastern and South Europe (ESE). At first, I will refer the theoretical pillars of environmental justice and my statement is that there is an expanding sphere concerning environmentalism which has grounded the theory of climate justice. The environmental justice has been expanded to climate justice, because it increasingly addressed that the environmental and social conditions provide for individual and community needs and functioning and justice depends on the environmental conditions. It has been put forward here that populism could bring closer the importance of environmental and climate related disasters to the people’s everyday lives and experience. In the next part of this paper the connection of climate justice and social problems in ESE has been analyzed. The investigation elaborated here is based on a very important initiative called Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) and its Environmental Justice Atlas. I will focus on two main environmental and climate injustice caused challenges: the first one is the situation of the Roma communities in ESE, and the second one is the emerging case of fuel or energy poverty. It has been raised here that an elitist populist regime, for instance in Hungary, how can damage the case of environmental and climate justice with instituted biopower. I will conclude this paper that we need to (re)enhance the social nature of environmental problems and this will strengthen the environmental consciousness in ESE. The relating discourse of environmental and climate justice in ESE is need to be based on environmental identities constructed on ethnical and social solidarity. Finally, we should have a look on the biopolitical structure of modern State.

Environmental Justice in the Anthropocene

I have a lecture at Environmental Justice in the Anthropocene Symposium, April 24-25, 2017 at Colorado State University. My lecture is dealing with political theoretical implications of enviroinmental and climate justice questions in Eastern and South Europe.

Environmental and Social Justice in Eastern and South Europe: Ecopopulism and Biopower

I am dealing in this paper with the question of environmental and climate (in)justices in Eastern and South Europe (ESE). At first, I will refer the theoretical pillars of environmental justice and my statement is that there is an expanding sphere concerning environmentalism which has grounded the theory of climate justice. The environmental justice has been expanded to climate justice, because it increasingly addressed that the environmental and social conditions provide for individual and community needs and functioning and justice depends on the environmental conditions. It has been put forward here that populism could bring closer the meaning of environmental and climate related disasters to the people’s everyday lives and experience. In the next part of this paper the connection of climate justice and social problems have been analyzed. The investigation elaborated here is based on a very important initiative called Environmental Justice Organizations, Liabilities and Trade (EJOLT) and its Environmental Justice Atlas. I will focus two main environmental and climate injustice caused challenges: the first one is the situation of the Roma communities in ESE, and the second one is the emerging case of fuel or energy poverty. I will conclude this paper that we need to (re)enhance the social nature of environmental problems and this will strengthen the environmental consciousness in ESE. The relating discourse of environmental and climate justice in ESE is need to be based on environmental identities constructed on ethnical and social solidarity. Finally we should have a look on the biopolitical structure of modern State.

You find the draft paper here.

My lecture is available at SlideShare.

Environmental and Social Justice in Eastern and South Europe_Ecopolitics and Biopower from Antal Attila

The Political Theory and Paradoxes of the Governing Populism in Hungary

I am going to have a lecture at Northeastern Political Science Association’s 48th Annual Meeting on November 10 - 12, 2016, Boston, Panel: CPT-3 Foucault, Anarchy, and Biopolitics.

The paper of this lecture is available here (academia.edu)

Abstract

After the regime change the Hungarian politics can be characterized by emerging populist tendencies. Before 2010 the populist forces were opposition parties, the post-2010 period is the era of governing populism in Hungary and at the same time the biggest opposition party (the far-right Jobbik) is populist too.

It will be argued in my lecture that the (populist) political theory of the governing party alliance (Fidesz-KDNP) is based on three main pillars. (1) The first one is the concept of the Political and massive anti-liberalism elaborated by Carl Schmitt. Schmitt describes the depoliticisation tendencies caused by liberalism, he also argues that the bureaucratic nature of liberalism promotes law instead of politics. (2) The second pillar is the Weberian concept of leader democracy, which argues that the political leader, who is creative and charismatic, has a strong political responsibility. (3) The third pillar is political constitutionalism, which is a counter-theory of legal or liberal constitutionalism and points out that the political institutions (parliaments and governments) cannot be restricted by legal institutions, first of all judges or constitutional courts.

Which is common in these three theories is the repoliticisation. The populist governing parties accused the opposition and the European Union that their politics is anti-politics and bureaucratic, they cannot make political decision, thereby endanger the (Hungarian and European) political community. On one hand it can be a very successful political strategy, on the other hand making constantly enemies can destroy the political community.

According to my hypothesis the populist promise of political leadership is inherently false, because instead of repoliticisation, the populist forces are monopolizing the political representation and liquidating the political responsibility. My second hypothesis is dealing with the paradox nature of the current Hungarian governing populism: while the governing parties promise more Political and emerging influence of people on political decisions, it could be confusing that the Hungarian government excludes certain groups from politics (preventing the holding of referendums; starting political wars against NGOs). This is the paradox nature of the Hungarian governing populism: the governing parties would like to be seen as populist forces, but they are acting as elites. Furthermore this elitist populist approach is upheld by the pure political realism which is one of the main driving forces of the regime.

Keywords

Hungary, Populism, Elitism, Viktor Orbán, the Political, Leader Democracy, Liberal and Legal Constitutionalism, Repoliticisation